Research

My research uses computational modeling and behavioral experiments to understand how people reason about other minds. I'm especially interested in the representations and computations underlying theory of mind — how we infer what others are thinking, feeling, and experiencing — and what happens when they are deployed in high-stakes real-world contexts like clinical care.


1. Theory of mind & cognitive processes

How do people infer the unobservable contents of other minds — what others are thinking, remembering, or experiencing? I build computational cognitive models of these inferences and test them behaviorally.

BIR Figure 1 — search trees and Rush Hour puzzle states
Quantitative reconstruction of other people's cognitive processes as Bayesian inverse reasoning
Berke, Sterling, Tenenbaum, Jara-Ettinger under review preprint
Earlier papers in this series
  • No signatures of first-person biases in theory of mind judgments about thinking
    Berke, Sterling, Tenenbaum, Jara-Ettinger · CogSci 2024 pdf
  • Thinking about thinking as rational computation
    Berke, Tenenbaum, Sterling, Jara-Ettinger · CogSci 2023 pdf
  • Thinking about thinking through inverse reasoning
    Berke, Jara-Ettinger · CogSci 2021 link
Core knowledge, visual illusions & the discovery of the self
Berke, Jara-Ettinger · Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2024 link
More papers in this line…
Berke, Jara-Ettinger · Integrating experience into Bayesian theory of mind · CogSci 2022 link
Zhang, Berke, Jara-Ettinger · Six-year-olds use an intuitive theory of attention to infer what others see, whom to trust, and what they want · CogSci 2025 link

2. ToM in communication

Theory of mind is not just for passive observation. It shapes how we interact, communicate, and even deceive. This line examines how people strategically deploy mental-state reasoning during communication and deception.

Lying paper figure — sender/audience diagram with beliefs and desires
People tailor lies to what others know and want (full version)
Berke, Sterling*, Zhi Yi*, Chandra, Jara-Ettinger (* equal contribution) under review
Earlier papers in this series
  • People use theory of mind to craft lies exploiting audience desires (proceedings)
    Berke*, Sterling*, Chandra, Jara-Ettinger · CogSci 2025 (* equal contribution) link
  • Reasoning about knowledge in lie production
    Zhi, Jara-Ettinger, Berke · CogSci 2024 link
Tracking minds in communication
Rubio-Fernandez, Berke, Jara-Ettinger · Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2024 link

3. ToM in the wild: Reasoning about pain, bodies & medicine

Attributing pain to someone else relies on both our theory of mind (what did they mean when they said, "it hurts like...") and our intuitive theory of how pain works. These intuitive theories of mind and body have direct consequences for how pain and stigmatized conditions are believed, dismissed, and treated in healthcare interactions.

Bodily Core Knowledge figure — visual and bodily perception engravings
Toward a formalization of human intuitive theories of bodily pain
Berke, Collins, Tenenbaum, Saxe · CogSci 2026
Bodily core knowledge
Berke, Casser · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · commentary on Bai et al. in press
Key outcomes of the vulvodynia therapeutic research summit
Krapf, Yong, Berke et al. · Obstetrics & Gynecology 2025 link

4. Comparative cognition

What representations does a system need for intelligent behavior?

A parallel thread uses evolutionary simulations, non-human primates, and artificial systems as mirrors for human cognition, allowing us to probe the kinds of representations that support intelligent behavior in the social and physical worlds.

In evolutionary simulations

Flexible goals require that inflexible perceptual systems produce veridical representations: implications for realism as revealed by evolutionary simulations
Berke, Walter-Terrill, Jara-Ettinger, Scholl · Cognitive Science 2022 pdf

In non-human primates

What primates know about other minds and when they use it: a computational approach to comparative theory of mind
Berke*, Horschler*, Royka, Santos, Jara-Ettinger (* equal contribution) under review preprint
Monkeys fail inference versions of classic intuitive physics prediction tasks
Royka, Townrow, Baker, Berke, Santos · CogSci 2026
NHP ToM model figure — 7-panel grid of computational models

In machines

MetaCOG: a hierarchical probabilistic model for learning meta-cognitive visual representations
Berke, Azerbayev, Belledonne, Tavares, Jara-Ettinger · UAI 2024 link · pdf
MetaCOG model demo animation